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THE DOLLAR, THE EURO AND EXCHANGE  
RATE REGIMES IN LATIN AMERICA 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The creation of the euro on January 1
st 1999 was one of the major economic events of the 
end of the 20
th century. Completing a lengthy process of economic integration, the 
emergence of the European Monetary Union is likely to produce significant 
transformations in international monetary and financial relationships. This view is based 
on the economic weight of the euro zone, similar to the weight of the United States, and 
on the desire of the monetary authorities not to restrain the internationalisation process of 
the new European currency. 
 
However, monetary history shows that the process of birth and decline of 
international currencies is very slow and subject to important inertia. This inertia is 
particularly important for the functions of medium of exchange and store of value. The 
two first years of existence of the euro confirm this view. They also seem to give some 
credit to the analyses, proposed before the creation of euro, which mentioned the 
possibility of an important role of the euro with respect to financial operations. These 
approaches also stressed the idea that the evolution of the international monetary system 
is related to the choice that will be made with respect to indebtment and investment 
currencies. In this respect, the significant growth of international bond issues in euro 
during the last two years is a very important fact. Latin America actively participated in 
the growth of the international euro bond market. This led us to study the long-term 
implications of this process of intensification of the financial relationships between 
Europe and Latin America, with a particular focus on exchange rate regimes. 
 
As a matter of fact, we explore one aspect which has not been addressed much in 
recent studies on the euro and Latin America: the link between the emergence of the euro 
and the function of unit of account. This function is not limited to the denomination of 
international trade; it also deals with the use of international currencies as anchors for 
monetary policy. The euro already plays the role of an anchor (alone or in baskets) for 
about 50 countries. This concerns first African countries, but also a great number of 
Eastern European countries, some of which are candidates for future admission in the 
euro zone. One may foresee the existence of a duopoly, less and less asymmetry with 
respect to international currencies, with an increasing proportion of developing country 
currencies pegged on the euro and/or the dollar. One interesting question is whether the 
euro is likely to be used for pegging local currencies in countries that are already strongly 
dollarised. 
 
This paper draws upon a study sponsored by ECLAC on “The Euro and Financial 
Relations between Latin America and Europe: Medium- and Long-Term Implications.”
1 
                                                           
1 Luis Miotti , Carlos Quenan and Dominique Plihon,  “The Euro and Financial Relations between Latin 
America and Europe: Medium- and Long-Term Implications,” Series Macroeconomia del desarrollo, N° 
13, Economic Development Division, ECLAC, March 2002.   2 
The paper starts with a survey of recent debates on possible evolutions of the 
international monetary system (IMS) in the medium to long run as a result of the creation 
of the euro. The central part of our study deals with a theoretical and empirical analysis 
of the determinants of de facto monetary pegging, as opposed to de jure exchange rate 
regimes published by the IMF. We present an econometrical analysis of the determinants 
of de facto exchange rate regimes of 93 countries. We put a specific emphasis on Latin 
American countries. 
 
 
 
The Euro and the IMS: Theoretical and Empirical Aspects  
 
The appearance of the euro on the international scene marks the beginning of a new era in 
international monetary and financial relations. The deepening process of integration that 
began in the 1950s and the creation of the euro represent decisive steps on the long road 
toward a truly common European market. At the same time, given the economic weight 
of "Euroland" and the will demonstrated by the European authorities, the advent of the 
euro provides the possibility of instituting a new international currency capable of 
competing with the dollar. The scenario that seems most plausible, i.e., an increasing but 
gradual bipolarisation of the IMS, is very likely to give rise to greater exchange-rate 
volatility unless the U.S. and European authorities implement a strengthened monetary 
cooperation, which does not for the moment seem to be on the horizon. 
 
Theoretical Framework  
 
The impact of the creation of the euro on international monetary relations will depend 
largely on the degree of internationalisation of the European monetary unit. It is useful, 
therefore, to begin by distinguishing between the different private and public uses of 
currencies on an international level, and then present the conditions required to achieve 
the internationalisation of a currency as they are formulated and analysed in the economic 
literature. This will make it possible to use these analytical tools to evaluate the extent to 
which the euro is likely to become an internationally used currency. 
 
A Typology of the International Use of Currencies 
 
On the basis of the typology proposed by Krugman
2 and following the presentation made 
by Bénassy-Quéré, Mojon and Schor,
3 we can distinguish six types of international uses 
of a currency as a function of a twofold criterion: (1), the three traditional functions of 
currencies, and (2) the private and public use of currencies on an international scale 
(Table 1). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
2 Paul Krugman, “The International Role of the Dollar: Theory and Prospects,” in Currency and Crises, 
MIT Press, 1991. 
3 Agnes Bénassy-Quéré, Benoit Mojon and Armand-Denis Schor, “The International Role of the Euro,” 
Document de travail,  No. 98-03, CEPII, Paris, 1998. 
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Table 1: International Uses of a Currency 
Function Private use Public use
Medium of exchange
Means of payment / vehicle 
currency
Intervention currency
Unit of account Price-setting / invoicing currency Reference currency (anchor)
Store of value
Investment and financing 
currency
Reserve currency
Source: Krugman (1991)  
 
An international currency is used by non-residents as a medium of exchange in 
trade transactions and capital movements. Private agents use an international currency as 
a vehicle, i.e. as an intermediary between two second-ranking currencies. Thus, 
transactions between Brazil and Thailand are broken up into two separate moments: 
reall/dollar and dollar/baht. In turn, monetary authorities also use international currencies 
as a medium of payment in their interventions in foreign-exchange markets. 
 
Secondly, an international currency is used as a unit of account by private agents 
to invoice their trade or financial international transactions. This function is different 
from that of a medium of payment in the sense that one transaction can be denominated 
in one currency and then paid in another (distinction between invoicing currency and 
medium of payment). Monetary authorities also make use of the unit-of-account function 
in implementing their exchange policies when they decide to anchor their currencies to an 
international reference currency. This has to do with exchange system issues. 
 
As a store of value, an international currency is used by private agents with the 
aim of preserving the value of their assets. They place their assets in different 
international currency denominations as part of their strategies to optimise their risk/yield 
ratio. In turn, monetary authorities manage the composition of their international reserves 
as a function both of their objective of optimising their risk/yield ratio and of the nature 
of their interventions in the foreign-exchange market. 
 
These different international uses of currencies are separable but interdependent. 
Schematically, the interaction between these different uses can move along various 
channels (see Figure 1). For example, the decision adopted by the monetary authorities 
to give priority to certain currencies in the composition of international reserves (store-of-
value function) can be conditioned in part by the choice of an anchoring mechanism with 
regard to these currencies (unit-of-account function). 
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Figure 1: Main Synergies between International Monetary Functions 
PRIVATE PUBLIC
Transaction cost
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Risk Policy
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Source: Bénassy-Quéré, Mojon and Schor (1998) 
 
Another channel has to do with transaction costs. If a currency is used as a vehicle 
currency, transaction costs are low and the monetary authorities will tend to use it in their 
interventions, while private investors will try to procure assets denominated in that 
currency. 
 
The degree of use of an international currency by a country can be very different 
depending on the above-mentioned functions: thus, the dollar may be chosen as the 
anchor currency by monetary authorities due to the overwhelming weight of the U.S. 
financial markets, even though the trade transactions of that same country may be 
denominated in other currencies. Likewise, it is possible to consider these functions 
hierarchically, i.e., the international medium of payment function is frequently considered 
to be the most important.
4  
 
Conditions for the Internationalisation of a Currency  
 
According to Bourguinat,
5 two criteria should be taken into account:  
 
•  Stability—predictability of the currency;  
•  Acceptability—liquidity: In order to be international, a currency must be 
universally accepted; it should be a "vehicle" currency, in the sense that it is used 
by other countries in transactions that do not involve a direct relationship with the 
issuing country. 
 
 
                                                           
4 Henri Bourguinat , “La concurrence des monnaies véhiculaires: vers le polycentrisme monétaire?” in 
Croissance, échange et monnaie en économie internationale, Mélanges en l’honneur de J. Weiller, 
Economica, Paris, 1985. 
5 Henri Bourguinat, “Les vertiges de la finance internationale,” Economica, Paris, 1987. 
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Tavlas
6 proposes two complementary criteria: 
 
•  The country issuing the international currency should have a major weight in 
international trade, thus reinforcing the use of this currency by the other countries. 
•  The country issuing the international currency should have free, broad and deep 
financial markets, thus guaranteeing the liquidity of the currency and making it 
possible for the currency to play a store-of-value role for private and public 
participants.  
 
These conditions are necessary but not sufficient to explain the reasons why 
international operators tend to favour one currency as a key currency. Some authors 
emphasise the role of transaction costs, economy of scale phenomena, positive 
externalities
7 and network effects.
8  These approaches make it possible to demonstrate the 
existence of self-reinforcing and inertial processes in the international use of currencies. 
From this point of view, the progress of the euro as an international currency should be 
gradual. In other words, the dollar should maintain its supremacy for a long while yet. 
 
The International Weight of the Euro Zone: Overview  
 
The weight of the euro zone relative to the American and the Japanese economies is one 
of the first empirical criterion to consider for the future role of the European currency in 
the international monetary system. If we compare the relative weights of the United 
States and the euro zone in the world economy, we can see that the euro zone has a 
greater weight in terms of population. At the same time, the weights of the euro zone and 
the United States are similar in terms of international trade, as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Weight of the United States and the Euro Zone in the World Economy 
Population GDP
Exte rnal 
openness
(1) (2) (2) % GDP (3)
Euro Zone 302.80     5875.60     3709.80   56.80     19.00    
United States 273.70     8590.10     11596.50   121.50     14.80    
Japan 126.80     4223.20     2263.40   48.20     9.90    
(1) Millions of inhabitants (2000) (2) Billions of dollars (2001)
(3) Exports/GDP in % (2000) Source: World Bank, Eurostat, OECD
Stock-market 
capitalisation
 
 
On the other hand, if we adopt GDP and stock exchange capitalisation as criteria, 
the weight of the United States is greater. This basic statistical data can lead us to 
                                                           
6 George Tavlas, “On the International Use of Currencies: The Case of the Deutsche Mark,” Princeton 
University, Essays on International Finance, No. 181, March 1991. 
7 Peter Kenen, “Exchange rates and the international monetary system,” Recherches Economiques de 
Louvain, Vol. 59,  No. 1-2, 1992. 
8 Michel Aglietta and Pierre Deusy-Fournier, “Internationalisation des monnaies et organisation du système 
monétaire”, Economie Internationale,  No. 59,  Paris, 1994. 
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consider that the euro has a strong potential to increase its share as an internationally used 
currency in the world economy. 
 
Another relevant factor to be considered is the position of the European 
authorities with regard to the internationalisation of the euro. Knowing that history and 
economic theory show that progress in the international use of a currency has to be 
gradual, the European officials are not actively seeking to promote the 
internationalisation of the euro. Unlike Japan, however, which has also resisted 
internationalising the use of the yen (because the Japanese consider that it might disrupt 
the behaviour of their monetary policy),  the European authorities do not oppose a 
growing internationalisation of the euro. Their position is that the zone's strategy in terms 
of monetary policy is sufficiently strong to face the implications of an increasing 
internationalisation of the euro currency.
9  Their position is, therefore, "neutral", and this 
in fact favours an increasing international use of the euro. 
 
The Euro in the International Scene: A Difficult Beginning 
 
A second empirical aspect of the international role of the euro is the strength of the 
European currency with respect to the dollar. Contrary to the predictions of a majority of 
specialists, the euro weakened substantially during its initial stages, and lost almost 30% 
of its value in the first few years of its existence. Three main groups of factors have been 
suggested to explain this: 
 
1. Economic factors. A gap has developed between the U.S. economy, which has 
been experiencing an exceptionally prosperous phase, and the euro zone, in which the 
growth cycle began later and has been less strong. One of the consequences of this 
situation is an interest-rate differential that favours the dollar. 
 
2. Financial factors, of a more structural nature. Although the United States is a 
major net importer of capital, the euro zone has been experiencing net outflows of long-
term capital (portfolio investment and direct foreign investment) that far exceed its 
current-account surpluses since 1994. The United States has a growing current-account 
deficit (over 4% of GDP), with a favourable basic balance thanks to massive capital 
inflows. In turn, the euro zone has a current-account surplus (around 0.5% of GDP) 
together with an unfavourable basic balance due to this significant outflow of capital. The 
deepening European integration and the creation of the euro have contributed in part to 
this situation. European companies have been pressed to increase their critical size, which 
has led to mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. market (which is also the epicentre of the 
new economy). Moreover, European companies have begun to participate increasingly in 
the movement to achieve geographic diversification of their security portfolios: between 
1998 and 2000 the volume of net purchases of foreign stock doubled. 
 
3. Institutional factors. The implementation of the EMU has not clarified the 
situation in terms of economic governance of the euro zone. Uncertainty still reigns on 
                                                           
9 Willem Duisenberg, “The International Role of the Euro,”  www.ecb.int, November 2002. 
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many levels, and from the viewpoint of foreign investors, the European Central Bank's 
policy is far from clear. This latter factor will probably be long-lasting; the strengthening 
of the European monetary authority entails a slow learning process.  
 
Nevertheless, the recent nominal depreciation of the euro arose from the fact that 
the dollar was undervalued at the time the euro currency was created. In effect, most of 
the studies conducted on the basis of a fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (developed 
by Williamson),
10 indicate that on the date the euro was introduced, it was overvalued 
vis-à-vis the dollar by an estimated 7 to 10 percent.
11  
 
The definition of an equilibrium exchange rate is, however, complex. The short 
term is dominated by the cycle, the medium term by the savings behaviour of the issuing 
zones, and the long term reflects the external positions of the two currency zones (Artus, 
1999), as well as the difference in their potential growth rates.  
 
This last point is crucial: a medium- and long-term source of uncertainty has to do 
with the ability of the European economy to draw nearer to the potential growth rate of 
the U.S. economy. A major portion of the studies on this subject show that the long-term 
trend in the growth rate of the euro zone is between 2.5% and 3%, while that of the 
United States is close to 4 percent. Even though the higher internal savings rate and the 
usually positive current-account balance of the euro zone tend to weaken the dollar, a 
persistent differential in terms of potential growth works against the strengthening of the 
euro in the long term. 
 
Another factor of uncertainty in the medium term arises from the behaviour of 
savings and investment in Europe. As we have seen, the euro zone is characterised by a 
current-account surplus, which is a reflection of surplus savings. This surplus is a result 
of the existence of substantial private savings, which are higher than the public deficits. 
This European configuration is just the opposite to that of the United States, which is 
characterised by a shortfall in savings in spite of its fiscal surplus. 
 
One can foresee that the overall saving rate in the euro zone will continue to be 
high for two main reasons. First, the reduction of fiscal deficits is an objective of the 
countries of the zone. Second, it is expected that households will increase their savings 
efforts for demographic reasons (aging population and pension funding). From this point 
of view, the development of financial markets linked to the creation of the euro should 
stimulate the accumulation of these financial savings. 
 
In principle, the abundance of savings in the euro zone should favour the 
appreciation of the euro currency. European savings, however, may be insufficient if the 
                                                           
10 John Williamson, “The Exchange Rate Systems,” Institute for International Economics, 1983. 
11 Didier Borowski and Cecile Couharde, “Parité euro/dollar et ajustements macro-économiques: que révèle 
une analyse en termes de taux de change d’équilibre ?” Revue d’Economie Financière, No. 49, Paris, 1998 
and Jérôme Teiletche, “La parité euro/dollar durant les décennies 80 et 90: peut-on trouver une 
spécification raisonnable et à quel horizon?” Etude. CDC. Paris, 2001.  
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companies of the zone increase their investment in Europe in order to reduce their 
relative lag vis-à-vis the United States (in particular in the new economy). If this takes 
place, the euro zone might even experience a major current-account deficit,
12 which could 
contribute to weakening the euro currency.  
 
The International Role of the Euro: Three Scenarios 
 
Although they are different issues, the movement of the euro exchange rate and the 
perspectives for the euro's role in the international sphere are not unconnected. If the euro 
depreciates permanently and there is scepticism concerning its parity, this could 
discourage its use and might affect its acceptance among the key IMS currencies. 
 
In any event, many authors expect a rise of the euro as an international currency. 
A majority of these studies emphasise that the financial role of the euro (that is to say, as 
a borrowing and lending currency) will develop much more rapidly than its international 
trade function (i.e. as an invoicing currency). This is confirmed by the two first years of 
the euro's life, in particular with regard to its role as a borrowing currency, which has 
developed significantly. This is a distinctive characteristic of the present 
internationalisation of the euro that will be analysed later on. 
 
On the other hand, some authors indicate that the progress of the "trade" euro 
might occur in "steps", with qualitative leaps, that should quicken the internationalisation 
of the euro currency
13 ( Figure 2). The same authors, however, also argue that an 
excessive delay in the development of the trade function of the euro could work against 
the establishment of its financial role: a "complete" international currency should not be 
subject to excessive or too protracted a divergence between its financial and trade roles. 
 
 
Figure 2: Theoretical Path of the Iinternationalisation of the Euro 
Euro share in international financial transactions
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  Source: de Boissieu (2000) 
 
                                                           
12 Patrick Artus, “Dollar/euro/yen: rôles respectifs, parités d’équilibre,” Etude No. 99-13, CDC, 
Paris,September, 1999. 
13 Christian de Boissieu, “L'euro et le rééquilibrage du système monétaire et financier international,” in 
Rapport Moral sur l'Argent dans le Monde 2000. Paris, December, 2000. 
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With regard to the evolution of the IMS in the medium to long term, it is possible 
to distinguish at least three scenarios. The first is an IMS that will long continue to be 
dominated by the dollar, which implies that the initial progress observed in terms of the 
financial function of the euro will be followed by back sliding and that the euro currency 
will fail to win definitive acceptance in that role. Second is the exact opposite scenario: 
the financial function of the euro becomes firmer and its trade role develops at a faster 
than expected rate. This would lead to an increasingly symmetrical dollar-euro duopoly. 
The last and seemingly most plausible scenario, taking into account the first steps of the 
euro in the international arena and the teachings of economic theory, is a duopoly that 
gradually decreases in asymmetry. A slow but growing bipolarisation of the IMS, 
however, also entails the development of the euro’s role as an anchor currency in the 
exchange systems of other countries.  
 
Within the framework of this most likely scenario, it seems clear that the volatility 
of the dollar-euro exchange rate is unlikely to decrease. On the contrary, as suggested by 
theoreticians on the role of leadership (such as Kindleberger), asymmetry and the 
existence of a clearly hegemonic currency are conditions that favour stability. Historic 
experience shows that the co-existence of two dominant currencies (as occurred with the 
pound and the dollar in the 1930s) can be a destabilising element and lead to 
unfavourable effects in third countries. 
 
Let us analyse the hypothetical reaction of the euro-dollar exchange rate to a trade 
shock that affects the Euroland/dollar bilateral current account under three possible 
scenarios for anchoring the currencies of third countries to the key currencies of the 
system: (1) general flotation where no currency is anchored to the dollar or the euro; (2) a 
hegemonic system in which all currencies except the euro are anchored to the dollar; and 
(3) a bipolar system in which both the United States and the euro zone conduct half their 
trade with the countries of their respective monetary blocs. We see that the hegemonic 
system, although less stable than the general flotation system, is in turn much less volatile 
than a bipolar IMS.
14  
 
Thus the current situation, set between the hegemonic and bipolar systems (i.e. an 
IMS in harmony with the increasingly bipolar but asymmetrical medium- to long-term 
scenario we see as most likely) entails high volatility between the two main international 
currencies. 
 
Prior to examining the first steps of the internationalisation of the euro in greater 
depth, it is useful to indicate that, within the framework of a growing bipolarisation of the 
IMS, we can foresee two possible configurations regarding the volatility of the euro-
dollar parity. On one hand, a "pessimistic" configuration of "competition" between the 
dollar and the euro, in which the U.S. and European monetary authorities continue to give 
priority to their domestic objectives and are uncooperative with each other, which would 
accentuate the instability of the bilateral parity. On the other hand, an "optimistic" 
                                                           
14 Agnes Bénassy-Quéré and Benoit Coeure, “Big and Small Currencies: The Regional Connection,” 
Document de travail,  No. 2000-10, CEPII, Paris, 2000. 
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configuration of strengthened monetary "co-operation": the U.S. and European authorities 
consider that international monetary stability is a public commodity and agree to 
intervene and monitor the evolution of their  exchange rates, and to progress toward 
coordinating their macroeconomic policies. In this configuration, the volatility of the 
euro-dollar exchange rate would decline. 
 
The former configuration appears to be most likely. While the IMS is in its 
current intermediate situation, it is difficult to imagine the United States being willing to 
give lower priority to its domestic objectives. On the other hand, the deficiencies in the 
institutional architecture of the EMU, including the absence of a unified political 
authority, makes it difficult to think that Europe could defend a coherent macroeconomic 
policy on an international scale. In any event, it is clear that the European monetary 
authorities do not have an explicit objective on the subject of the exchange rate and seem 
to be increasingly inclined to practice a policy of "benign neglect" as long as the degree 
of external openness of the euro zone is less than that of their member countries 
considered individually. 
 
Empirical analysis (see Box 1) confirms these hypotheses. As shown in Table 3 
and  Figure 3, the euro/dollar exchange rate has become more volatile since the 
introduction of the euro currency.  
 
Table 2: Volatility of the Euro/Dollar Parity 
(annual and quarterly averages based on daily data) 
Volatility
Five-month 
moving average
Trend (Hodrick-
Prescott Filter)
1998 5.20       5.23            5.84           
1999 6.47       6.61            7.04           
2000 9.99       9.50            8.78           
Q1 2001 10.89       10.43            9.90           
Source: Authors' calculations  
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Figure 3: Annualised Volatility of Euro/Dollar Parity 
(On the basis of daily data) 
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Source: Authors' calculations 
 
Box 1: Method for Calculating the Annualised Volatility 
 
The data used are taken from the spot quotations in the New York market at their closing price. We have 
used the exchange rate of the German mark between 01/01/1971 and 31/12/1998 and the exchange rate of 
the euro between 01/01/1999 and 11/05/2001. 
 
As of the introduction of the euro on 1/01/1999, this currency was converted to German marks using the 
conversion rate established for the member countries of the monetary union. 
 
Annualised volatility was calculated using the following formula:  
 
()
σ =
∑ − ∑

 

 
−
==
n xx
nn
i
i
n
i
i
n
2
11
2
1
 
 Where:  
  i x  = daily quotation 
   i    = day 
  n  = number of monthly quotations 
  σ  is multiplied by 100 in accordance with financial standards 
 
On the basis of the volatility data calculated as shown above, a five-month moving average was calculated 
using the Hodrick-Prescott method
15 in order to eliminate the strong fluctuations in the volatility and its 
trend. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
15  This is a smoothing method that is widely used among macro-economists to obtain a smooth estimate of 
the long-term trend component of a series. The method was first used in a working paper (circulated in the 
early 1980s and published in 1997) by Hodrick and Prescott to analyse post-war U.S. business cycles.   12  
Emergence of the Euro and the Unit-of-Account Function:   
Implications for Latin America 
 
The increased volatility of exchange rates has put forward the question of the unit-of-
account function of international currencies. As a result, studies on the creation of the 
euro and its prospect as an international currency have largely focused on its functions as 
a medium of payment, financing and borrowing. Recently, the management of 
international reserves and the potential role of the euro as a reserve currency have also 
begun to be studied.
16 Conversely, the unit-of-account function is often neglected, 
probably because currency price-setting in international trade is particularly subject to 
inertia resulting from the existence of grid externalities. Another factor that is usually put 
forward to explain this is that invoicing currencies appear to derive their use from their 
other functions.
17  
 
As previously mentioned, the unit-of-account function not only has to do with 
price-setting in international trade; it also concerns the use of international currencies as 
reference (anchor) currencies, which is one of the crucial functions in the 
internationalisation process.  In the short term, it will be very difficult for the euro to 
compete with the dollar as a worldwide anchor currency, given that decisions in this 
sphere are linked to the type of integration—in both trade (geographic pattern of trade 
flows) and financing (borrowing currencies, FDI sources, etc.) —as well as to trade 
practices (as previously mentioned, most commodities trade is conducted in dollars). In 
particular, the existence of strong inertia in trade and financial practices hinders a more 
rapid development of the euro as an international currency. In any event, the use of the 
euro as an anchor currency of third countries can be expected to increase in the medium 
and long term. 
 
In this section, we will: (1) address the issue of the de facto determination of 
currency anchors, as against the officially-stated anchors, i.e., those published by the IMF 
(in its Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions); (2) study 
the real and financial determinants of the options adopted by developing countries in 
terms of de facto anchoring on the basis of an econometric analysis conducted for 93 
economies; (3) build a typology of the analysed countries; and (4) explore ways in which 
the euro could be adopted as an anchor currency across Latin America. 
 
De facto Anchoring Arrangements: Methodology 
 
Following the approach proposed by Bénassy—Quéré and Cœuré, an estimate is made of 
de facto exchange arrangements through the use of econometric equations based on the 
generalised moments method (see Annex 1). The implicit anchors of 111 currencies have 
been estimated on the basis of weekly data both before and after the financial crises of the 
emerging countries (1997-98).  
                                                           
16 George Alogoskoufis, Richard Portes and Helene Rey, “The Emergence of the Euro as an International 
Currency,” Economic Policy, Vol. 5, 1997, and most importantly, Barry Eichengreen and Donald 
Mathieson, 2000. 
17 Bénassy-Quéré and Cœuré.   13  
 
The results show that the proportion of currencies with de facto anchoring to the 
dollar is much higher (50%) than could be surmised from the official data published by 
the IMF (see Tables 4 and 5). This phenomenon has continued after the Asian crisis, 
suggesting that, at least in the short term, the current system has not changed as 
substantially as is usually suggested (i.e., decline in peg to a reference currencies and 
generalisation of pure floats). Therefore, pure floats are much less frequent de facto (4%) 
than de jure (30%).  
 
These results converge in part with those obtained by Levy Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger,
18 who observed numerous de facto anchors. In addition, there does not 
appear to have been a decline in the so-called intermediate arrangements (one 
characteristic of which is an anchor to a basket of currencies). This has been 
demonstrated by Masson (2000) using a dynamic analysis of the transitions between 
exchange arrangements. 
 
Table 4: Official Exchange Arrangements and their Evolution 
(% of all IMF member country currencies, in December of each year) 
Exchange arrangements 1983 1988 1994 1999
Number of currencies 146    152    181    187   
Fixed anchor to one currency (including 
currency boards)
35.6    38.3    26.0    30.0   
Dollar 23.3    25.7    13.8    15.0   
Franc, mark, euro 8.9    9.2    8.3    12.3   
Other 3.4    3.4    3.9    2.7   
Fixed anchor to a basket of currencies 27.4    25.7    13.3    9.6   
SDR 8.9    5.3    1.7    3.2   
Ecu 0.7    0.7    0.6    0.0   
Other 17.8    19.7    11.0    6.4   
Limited flexibility 11.0    7.2    7.2    5.9   
European exchange mechanism 4.8    4.6    5.0    1.1   
Other 6.2    2.6    2.2    4.8   
Limited float 19.9    17.8    19.9    23.0   
Free float 6.1    11.2    33.7    31.6   
TOTAL 100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0   
Source: IMF, Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, several numbers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
18 Eduardo Levy Yeyati and Federico Sturzenegger, “Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes: Deeds vs 
Words,” Working Paper, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, 1999. 
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Table 5: De facto Exchange Arrangements 
(% of all currencies analysed) 
April 1995-June 1997 
(prior to the Asian crisis)
October 1998-
December 1999 (after 
the Asian crisis)
Number of currencies 107.0                  107.0                 
Unit anchor to one 
currency
61.8                  59.8                 
Dollar 50.6                  49.5                 
Euro 10.3                  10.3                 
Yen 0.9                  0.0                 
Partial anchor to one 
currency
13.0                  9.3                 
Dollar 12.1                  6.5                 
Euro 0.9                  1.9                 
Yen 0.0                  0.9                 
Anchor to a basket of 
currencies
20.5                  27.1                 
Dollar/euro 12.1                  14.0                 
Dollar/yen 5.6                  2.8                 
Euro/yen 1.9                  2.8                 
Euro/dollar/yen 0.9                  7.5                 
Free float 4.7                  3.7                 
TOTAL 100.0                  100.0                 
Note: the 14 African countries of the franc zone are treated as a single country
Source: Bénassy-Quéré and Coeuré (2000)  
 
In sum, according to the approach adopted in this study, the international 
monetary system does not seem to be evolving toward a general use of floats. Moreover, 
Bénassy—Quéré and Cœuré note that the IMS is still a long way from a configuration of 
different currency blocks of comparable size. 
 
Financial and Trade Determinants of de facto Anchors 
 
On the basis of the results presented in the previous section, we will now focus on the 
real and financial determinants of the de facto anchoring arrangements adopted by the 93 
countries considered. Table 6 shows the correlations between the anchoring coefficients 
and the trade, financial and geographic variables.
19  
 
This table shows, mainly, that the anchoring coefficients are correlated with the 
trade and financial variables. The use of the euro as a de facto anchor currency correlates 
significantly with the use of the euro as a borrowing currency (0.197) and with the 
geographic pattern of trade (0.458), i.e. those cases in which Europe is predominant as a 
client and supplier of the countries considered. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that 
the countries of Europe (Central, East and South), as well as the African countries of the 
franc zone, have a strong correlation with the use of the euro as a de facto anchor 
currency (either as the sole currency or as the dominant currency in anchor baskets). 
                                                           
19 The anchoring coefficients are taken from Bénassy–Quéré and Cœuré (2000). The following binary 
variables were associated with those variables: Dolbin= 1 if the coefficient is equal to or higher than 0.5, 0 
if it is lower; Eurobin= 1 if the coefficient is equal to or higher than 0.3, 0 if it is lower; Yenbin= 1 if the 
coefficient is equal to or higher than 0.1, 0 if it is lower. The "oil-exporting" binary variable is assigned to 
countries whose oil sales represent over 10% of their total exports. The "dollarised" binary variable is 
attributed to countries where the dollar share in M3 is high, following IMF typology. Geographical 
distances are measured in kilometers (km) between ports or capitals.    15  
 
Table 6: Trade, Debt and de-facto Anchoring Arrangements 
 
Correlation table 
Dollar Euro Yen Dolbin Eurobin Yenbin
Dollar 1.000    -0.969    -0.612    0.911    -0.937    -0.589   
Euro -0.969    1.000    0.396    -0.859    0.884    0.393   
Yen -0.612    0.396    1.000    -0.634    0.649    0.927   
Dolbin 0.911    -0.859    -0.634    1.000    -0.865    -0.602   
Eurobin -0.937    0.884    0.649    -0.865    1.000    0.652   
Yenbin -0.589    0.393    0.927    -0.602    0.652    1.000   
In Dollars 0.019    -0.044    0.069    -0.032    -0.021    0.096   
In Euros -0.272    0.197    0.378    -0.356    0.292    0.350   
In Yens 0.205    -0.144    -0.292    0.213    -0.142    -0.251   
Dollarised 0.089    -0.016    -0.276    0.166    -0.154    -0.206   
Oil-exporting 0.140    -0.129    -0.104    0.144    -0.202    -0.155   
With United States 0.355    -0.352    -0.195    0.370    -0.371    -0.198   
With Japan 0.251    -0.240    -0.164    0.226    -0.222    -0.178   
With Europe -0.451    0.458    0.211    -0.465    0.439    0.159   
Dollar Euro Yen Dolbin Eurobin Yenbin
kmUS 0.017    -0.019    -0.005    -0.032    0.020    -0.043   
kmJapan -0.089    0.017    0.274    -0.143    0.092    0.241   
kmEurope 0.446    -0.468    -0.162    0.454    -0.415    -0.174   
LATIN AMERICA 0.341    -0.331    -0.208    0.398    -0.360    -0.179   
CENTRAL 0.202    -0.199    -0.112    0.276    -0.195    -0.032   
SOUTH 0.245    -0.234    -0.162    0.240    -0.278    -0.210   
ASI A 0.312    -0.284    -0.252    0.299    -0.287    -0.261   
MIDDLE EAST 0.153    -0.132    -0.146    0.139    -0.161    -0.122   
EUROPE -0.358    0.456    -0.127    -0.209    0.273    -0.087   
AFRICA -0.364    0.253    0.539    -0.506    0.424    0.481   
AFRICA-CFA -0.532    0.365    0.805    -0.668    0.578    0.765   
AFRICA-NCFA 0.047    -0.029    -0.085    0.001    -0.017    -0.118   
Sources: Trade: DOTS-IMF (2000), Debt: World Bank (WDI 2000),
Dollarisation: IMF 174 (1998), Exchange arrangements: Bénassy-Quéré (2000)
Notes: Figures in boldface indicate statistically significant correlations 
CFA: CFA franc zone CNFA: other African countries
Foreign trade structure
Degree of dollarisation of the economies
Debt structure by currency
Oil exports
Correlations table
Geography and anchoring arrangements
Geographic distances
Geographic areas
 
 
To complete the analysis, we conducted an econometric probability study (Table 
7).    16  
Table 7: Probability of Using an International Currency 
Coef. Z-Stat Proba. Coef. Z-Stat Proba. Coef. Z-Stat Proba.
Constant 1.40   1.22 0.222  -0.32   -0.36 0.716  -0.66   -0.57 0.568 
With Japan 0.27   2.30 0.022 -0.19    -2.64 0.008  -0.03   -0.35 0.724 
With Europe -0.04   -3.04 0.002 0.03    2.20 0.028 -0.03    -2.11 0.035 
With USA 0.04   2.12 0.034 -0.04    -2.52 0.012 -0.09    -3.59 0.000 
In dollars 0.00   0.034  0.973  -0.01   -0.44 0.660  0.06   2.42 0.015 
In euros -0.10   -3.441  0.001 0.06    2.70 0.007 0.16    3.57 0.000 
In yen 0.12   3.501  0.001 -0.06    -2.33 0.020 -0.90    -3.75 0.000 
Oil-exporting 1.82   2.79 0.005 -1.26    -2.15 0.032 -1.78    -2.07 0.039 
Dollarised 0.21   0.43 0.666  -0.19   -0.46 0.645  -1.70   -2.43 0.015 
Restr. log likelihood -19.55 -25.44 -13.66
Probability(LR stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Obs w ith Dep=0 27.00 58.00 68.00
Obs w ith Dep=1 63.00 31.00 18.00
Included observations 90.00 89.00 86.00
McFadden R-squared 0.64 0.56 0.69
% Correct 92.1% 83.9% 72.2%
Notes: Figures in boldface indicate variables w ith a significance level at least 90%.
Ow ing to problems multicollinearity betw een the trade variables and those that represent
geographic distances, the latter have not been included in the econometric estimate.
Other determinants
Debt composition by currency
Direction of trade
Dollar Euro Yen
 
 
The econometric estimates suggest that the likelihood of using the dollar as an 
anchor currency increases when the United States is a major trading partner of the 
country in question. Symmetrically, the likelihood declines when the main partner is 
Europe.  
 
As regards to the predominance of a currency for borrowing purposes, when a 
country is indebted mainly in dollars, the likelihood of using the U.S. currency as an 
anchor is not significant. This is explained by that fact that all the countries of the sample 
are mainly indebted in dollars. In addition, the likelihood of anchoring a currency to the 
dollar declines significantly when a major part of the external debt of the country 
considered is denominated in euros. On the other hand, oil-exporting countries have a 
strong likelihood of anchoring their currencies to the dollar because the international oil 
trade is conducted in dollars. 
 
For the yen, the results of the econometric equations concerning the likelihood of 
anchoring a currency to the Japanese currency are poor. Thus, being a major trading 
partner of Japan does not increase the likelihood of using the yen as an anchor currency. 
Moreover, the likelihood of using the yen as an anchor decreases significantly when the 
foreign debt of a country is denominated in that currency. Lastly, as would be expected, 
in the oil-exporting countries and those that are noted for a high degree of dollarisation in 
their economies, the likelihood of anchoring their currencies to the yen is slight. Several 
factors serve to explain these econometric results: One is the crisis that has affected Japan 
since 1990. Another is the strong nominal and real short-term fluctuations experienced by 
the yen in the past years.  Uncertainty regarding the Japanese economy and the volatility 
of the yen increases transaction costs and exchange-rate risks. Yet another factor is the 
absence of political will—not to mention the hostility—by the Japanese authorities with 
regard to developing the yen as an international currency.    17  
For the euro, the likelihood that a country will use it as an anchor currency 
decreases when the trade of a country is conducted mainly with Japan or the United 
States, and increases if it is conducted with the euro-zone countries, again assuming these 
countries are major trading partners. Likewise, the results of the exercise confirm that the 
likelihood of using the euro as an anchor increases when a major part of the external debt 
of the country considered is denominated in euros. On the other hand, and inverting the 
equation that analyses the use of the dollar as an anchor, the likelihood of anchoring a 
national currency to the euro declines significantly for oil-exporting countries. 
 
A Typology of Countries 
 
The factors considered up to now can be analysed more deeply in order to identify the 
positioning of the countries of the sample. To achieve this, a factor analysis of the main 
components is conducted (see Annex 2), making it possible to group the countries with 
homogenous trade, financial and geographical features. We begin by showing how we 
organised the information (Table 8). 
 
Table 8: Inherent Values and Correlations between Main Variables and Factors  
For the first four axes (significant) 
Inherent values   1 2 3 4
Value 2.40     2.05     1.19     1.02    
% variability 26.63     22.75     13.23     11.35    
% aggregate 26.63     49.37     62.60     73.95    
factor 1 factor 2 factor 3 factor 4
Trade w ith USA 0.75     -0.09     0.00     0.45    
Trade w ith Japan 0.01     0.70     -0.03     -0.35    
Trade w ith Europe -0.72     -0.26     -0.03     -0.28    
Debt in dollars 0.61     -0.36     -0.22     -0.39    
Debt in yen 0.06     0.66     -0.13     0.38    
Debt in euros -0.60     -0.26     0.30     0.52    
Distance from USA -0.40     0.65     0.42     -0.15    
Distance from Japan 0.12     -0.55     0.71     -0.14    
Distance from Europe 0.64     0.36     0.59     -0.08      
 
The four main axes represent 74% of the aggregate variability. In other words, 
approximately three-quarters of the total information contained in the variables can be 
summarised in these four main axes. Figure 4 makes it possible to identify the opposition 
between the variables that are more strongly linked to the dollar with regard to those that 
are more related to the euro. 
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Figure 4: Circle of Correlations: axes 1 and 2 (50% ) 
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Figure 5 presents the projection of the countries in the factor space defined by the two 
main axes, which summarise approximately 50% of the total information contained in the 
variables used. Predictably, a great majority of the Latin American countries are situated 
in the south-eastern region of the factor space dominated by trade with the United States 
and indebtedness mainly denominated in dollars. 
 
Figure 5: Projection of Countries in the Factor Space Defined by  
Axes 1 and 2 (50%) 
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From the country coordinates in the factor space defined by the main four axes, 
we can identify five different groups (Table 9). 
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Table 9: Typology of Countries on the Basis of PCFA Results 
Classification of observations / Number of countries 
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
15 26 16 22 14
Bulgaria Benin Bangladesh Argentina Cameroon
Croatia Burkina Faso Cambodia Barbados Congo, Rep.
Czech Rep. Burundi China Bolivia Cote d'Ivoire
Dominica
Central African 
Rep.
India Brazil
Egypt, Arab 
Rep.
Equatorial 
Guinea
Chad Indonesia Chile Estonia
Grenada Comoros Jordan Colombia Gabon
Kazakhstan Djibouti Korea, Rep. Costa Rica Hungary
Latvia Ethiopia Lao PDR Dominican Rep. Mali
Lebanon Gambia, The Malaysia Ecuador Morocco
Lithuania Ghana Mongolia El Salvador Niger
Poland Guinea-Bissau Nepal Guatemala Nigeria
Romania Iran, Islamic Rep. Pakistan Guyana
Russian 
Federation
Slovak 
Republic
Kenya Philippines Haiti Tunisia
Syrian Arab 
Rep.
Madagascar Sri Lanka Honduras Turkey
Ukraine Malaw i Thailand Jamaica
Mauritania Vietnam Mexico
Mauritius Nicaragua
Mozambique Panama
Paraguay Peru
Senegal
Trinidad and 
Tobago
Seychelles Uruguay
Sierra Leone Venezuela
Tanzania
Togo
Zambia
Zimbabw e  
 
A second econometric exercise, taking into account the coordinates of the 
countries on the factor plane (which summarise the information provided by the variables 
used to calculate the factor axes) confirms the fact that exporting oil increases the 
likelihood of anchoring the national currency to the dollar and significantly decreases the 
likelihood of anchoring it to the euro. In turn, a high degree of dollarisation of the 
economy strongly increases the likelihood of anchoring the national currency to the dollar 
and appreciably decreases the likelihood of anchoring it to the euro (Table 10). 
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Table 10: Probability of Using an International Currency 
Probit Equations on the Factor Coordinates 
Coef. Z-Stat Proba. Coef. Z-Stat Proba. Coef. Z-Stat Proba.
Constant 1.35 2.82 0.005  -0.45 -1.48 0.139  -1.28 -3.04 0.002 
Axis 1 1.45 3.65 0.000 -1.02 -4.50 0.000 -0.26 -2.13 0.034 
Axis 2 2.27 3.38 0.001 -1.35 -3.35 0.001 -1.26 -3.30 0.001 
Axis 3 0.83 2.79 0.005 
Oil-exporting 1.56 1.87 0.061 -1.67 -2.41 0.016  -0.75 -1.38 0.168 
Dollarised 1.83 2.74 0.006 -0.99 -2.12 0.034  -0.36 -0.86 0.391 
Restr. log likelihood -54.10 -57.68 -49.16
Probability(LR stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Obs w ith Dep=0 27.00 57.00 70.00
Obs w ith Dep=1 63.00 31.00 21.00
Included observations 90.00 88.00 91.00
McFadden R-squared 0.70 0.60 0.38
% Correct 95.3% 81.3% 57.1%
Notes: Figures in boldface indicate variables w ith a significance of at least 90%. 
Euro
Direction of trade
Other determinants
Dollar Yen
 
 
Even more importantly, a final econometric exercise relating the groups of 
countries and the de facto anchoring currencies shows that groups 3 and 4 have a 
statistically significant relationship with the dollar. At the same time, groups 1 and 2 
appear to be areas that anchor to a basket (dollar-euro in group 1, euro-yen in group 2), 
whereas group 5 is characterised by a statistically significant relationship with the euro. 
The Latin American and Caribbean countries, included mostly in group 4, are 
unequivocally part of the dollar zone (Table 11). 
 
Table 11: Geographic Groups and International Currencies 
Probit Equations on the Basis of the Typology 
Coef. Z-Stat Proba. Coef. Z-Stat Proba. Coef. Z-Stat Proba.
Constant -1.16 -2.77 0.006  -0.85 -1.84 0.065  -0.71 -1.42 0.156 
Group 1 1.23 2.75 0.006 0.87 1.80 0.071 0.52 1.01 0.315 
Group 2 2.56 4.40 0.000 1.34 2.18 0.030 
Group 3 9.56 22.74 0.000 0.08 0.14 0.889 
Group 4 9.62 22.89 0.000 -0.48 -0.75 0.454 -7.28 -14.89 0.000 
Group 5 0.61 0.98 0.329 1.56 2.70 0.007 
Oil-exporting 0.47 1.11 0.269 -0.39 -1.10 0.271  -0.33 -0.91 0.364 
Dollarised 1.07 2.07 0.039 -1.51 -2.68 0.007  -1.08 -2.46 0.014 
Restr. log likelihood 43.56 37.86 24.05
Probability(LR stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Obs w ith Dep=0 28.00 59.00 70.00
Obs w ith Dep=1 65.00 34.00 23.00
Included observations 93.00 93.00 93.00
McFadden R-squared 0.38 0.31 0.23
% Correct 87.7% 82.4% 21.7%
Notes: Figures in boldface indicate variables w ith a significance of at least 90%. 
Other determinants
Reference
Reference
Reference
Groups resulting from the typology
Dollar Euro Yen
 
 
Implications for Latin America 
 
In spite of their apparent obviousness, the results obtained are not devoid of interest. Our 
evidence confirms the logical assumption that the pre-eminence of the dollar as an anchor 
currency is favoured by inertial factors. In addition, the degree of dollarisation of the   21  
economies considered, as well as the intensity of the financial and trade relations with the 
United States, are factors that reinforce the role of the dollar as an anchor currency. Thus, 
virtually none of the Latin American countries break away from the dollar zone. Our 
analysis shows that the often-mentioned "rifts" between Mexico and the countries of 
Central America, on one the hand, and the countries of South America, on the other, have 
little basis in fact. 
 
However the use of the euro as the sole anchor currency is clearly confined to 
countries whose trade and financial relations with the European monetary union are very 
close (group 5 of our typology, made up mainly of African and Central/East European 
countries). As shown by Boone and Maurel,
20 for example, for these countries the euro 
represents a more "natural" regional anchor currency than the dollar. In particular, the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and those of North Africa, which conduct a 
sizeable portion of their trade with the euro zone, display activity cycles that coincide 
quite closely with those of Europe, as well as specialisation structures that are relatively 
similar to those of Western Europe. 
 
Our study also indicates, however, that the euro participates, in numerous cases 
(groups 1 and 2 of our typology), in de facto anchoring baskets. This point is important: 
in a medium- to long-term perspective, the euro’s potential for increasing its share in the 
anchor baskets cannot be disregarded. Indeed, another result of this study is that the 
likelihood of anchoring a national currency to the dollar decreases strongly when the 
share of debts denominated in euros increases. 
 
Since 1997 there has been an increase in the euro-denominated bonds as a share 
of total issues by Latin American countries. Table 12 shows that, for a group of selected 
countries - the largest economies of the region, the use of the euro as a borrowing 
currency is increasing rapidly. More precisely, the euro’s share of government-securities 
issue has reached very high levels in the case of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and 
Venezuela.  
 
On the other hand, as was noted in the second part of this study, the international 
component of private-sector bonds in euros has grown substantially. It is not unlikely, 
therefore, that Latin American firms may tend progressively toward debt issues 
denominated in euros. The growing penetration of European banks in Latin America, the 
sustained increase of European banking loans to Latin American countries and the boom 
of foreign investment of European origin in the region could intensify this trend. 
 
Thus, in the medium to long term, the Latin American countries that participate 
more actively in the process of development of the single European currency as a 
borrowing currency might consider the use of the euro as a component of anchor 
currency baskets. Obviously, the dollar would continue to have a pre-eminent position in 
these currency baskets, given its entrenchment in Latin America. 
                                                           
20 Laurence Boone and Mathilde Maurel, “L'ancrage de l'Europe centrale et orientale à l'Union 
européenne,”  Revue Economique, Vol. 50,  No. 6, Paris,  November 1999. 
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Table 12: Change in Share of Euro-Denominated Issues in Selected Countries 
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Venezuela
1993 0.0%     0.0%    0.0%   0.0%     1.0%    0.0%     
1994 0.0%     12.9%    0.0%   0.0%     0.0%    0.0%     
1995 21.0%     6.5%    0.0%   0.0%     0.0%    0.0%     
1996 7.5%     2.2%    0.0%   0.0%     0.0%    0.0%     
1997 8.6%     3.9%    0.0%   0.0%     0.0%    0.0%     
1998 5.8%     3.6%    0.0%   0.0%     5.4%    0.0%     
1999 29.2%     4.5%    18.5%   0.0%     0.0%    0.0%     
2000 20.9%     16.8%    0.0%   0.0%     40.1%    0.0%     
1993 28.2%     0.0%    0.0%   0.0%     4.5%    14.4%     
1994 22.4%     0.0%    0.0%   0.0%     0.0%    0.0%     
1995 37.8%     34.7%    0.0%   21.1%     12.8%    48.8%     
1996 47.2%     30.5%    0.0%   11.0%     18.7%    68.6%     
1997 28.4%     29.1%    0.0%   0.0%     33.1%    0.0%     
1998 57.0%     32.5%    0.0%   16.0%     16.1%    26.0%     
1999 56.1%     58.3%    0.0%   0.0%     13.9%    54.3%     
2000 51.7%     25.3%    0.0%   36.1%     19.9%    68.5%     
1993 10.7%     0.0%    0.0%   0.0%     2.3%    13.8%     
1994 9.9%     11.5%    0.0%   0.0%     0.0%    0.0%     
1995 33.3%     15.7%    0.0%   8.8%     11.1%    48.8%     
1996 39.2%     13.6%    0.0%   9.7%     15.7%    68.6%     
1997 22.8%     16.6%    0.0%   0.0%     22.5%    0.0%     
1998 44.3%     17.7%    0.0%   16.0%     11.9%    26.0%     
1999 52.9%     43.2%    12.7%   0.0%     8.3%    54.3%     
2000 47.7%     24.4%    0.0%   36.1%     23.7%    68.5%     
Sources: CDC IXIS, Department of Economic and Financial 
Analysis, Country-Risk and Emerging-Markets Unit, Bondware
Private-sector bond issues
Government bond issues
Total bond issues (private-sector+government) 
 
 
This hypothesis is consistent with the analyses in the theoretical and applied 
literature on the choice of anchor currencies. According to Bénassy-Quéré and Lahrèche-
Révil
21 for instance, the relatively diversified geographic patterns of the foreign trade of 
some of the large Latin America countries (except of Mexico) could justify the adoption 
of a basket including the euro. These authors even suggest the hypothesis that countries 
of the region might create regional monetary unions linked to a basket of currencies 
including the euro. On the strength of our findings, we might add that a key factor to 
increase the possibility of adopting baskets including the euro is the intensification of 
financial relations between Europe and Latin America. 
 
Undoubtedly, anchoring to a single currency—in this case the dollar—represents 
a very attractive alternative in Latin America. With regard to the prospect of regional 
monetary unions, the unilateral decision to link the national currency to the dollar is an 
"easy" solution that involves fewer demands in terms of regional coordination and 
cooperation. In addition, full participation in the dollar zone may increase foreign 
investment attracted by exchange-rate risk diversification.
22 Still more importantly, a 
                                                           
21 Agnes Bénassy-Quéré and Amina Lahrèche-Révil, “L’Euro comme monnaie de référence à l’est et au 
sud de l’Union européenne,” Revue Economique  No. 50-2, Paris, 1999. 
22 Agnes Bénassy-Quéré, Lionel Fontagne and Amina Lahrèche-Révil, “Exchange-Rate Strategies in the 
Competition for Attracting FDI,”  CEPII Working Paper,  No. 99-16, CEPII, Paris, 1999. 
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policy of anchoring to a single key currency can easily be tested by the market. 
Transparency thus contributes to rapidly reinforce the credibility of the countries that 
adopt this type of policy.
23  In turn, in Latin America, where the degree of dollarisation is 
in fact high and the question of credibility is crucial to many countries, the issue of the 
dollar’s role goes beyond the discussion of a dollar peg. The debate conducted openly 
since 1999 is increasingly focused on the advantages and disadvantages of total 
dollarisation; that is to say, the replacement—in principle, irreversible—of the national 
currencies by the dollar, as has recently occurred in Ecuador and El Salvador.  
 
As long as credibility in Latin America is associated with establishing a close 
relationship with the dollar (in the form of de jure anchoring or floating arrangements 
involving de facto anchoring) and, in some way, to the Federal Reserve, the possibility of 
adopting baskets including the euro will be limited. There are two arguments, however, 
that can serve to temper this statement: 
 
1.  As indicated by Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger,
24 with the launching of the euro, 
the European Central Bank could—if its policy is successful—offer a new 
alternative in the medium or long term to countries in search of credibility. 
Although both the Federal Reserve and the ECB are obviously extremely wary of 
any proposal to share the management of monetary policy with third countries, 
these authors argue that they might be less reluctant to some type of exchange 
agreement with certain Latin American countries. The so-called European 
Monetary System (EMS), an exchange agreement that links the European Union 
with other European countries that are applying for membership, represents an 
interesting antecedent—although of course it is intrinsically inapplicable to other 
countries or regions. 
 
2.  The previously-mentioned factors conducive to adoption of anchor baskets could 
be strengthened by the medium- to long-term international scenario that is 
favoured in this study. An increasingly bipolar but asymmetrical IMS presupposes 
high volatility between the two main international currencies. In this context, 
anchoring exclusively to the dollar could prove fatal for countries that have major 
trade and financial relations with the euro zone. Conversely, anchoring to a basket 
that includes the euro would be decisive in reducing vulnerability—and, hence, 
increase credibility—to abrupt exchanges-rate swings among the main reference 
currencies. As already mentioned, this is one of the objectives of the decision 
adopted recently by Argentina, which is to anchor the peso to a basket made up of 
the dollar and the euro whenever these two currencies achieve a one-to-one 
exchange-rate. 
                                                           
23 Jeffrey Frankel, Sergio Schmukler and Luis Serven, “Verifiability: A Rationale for the Failure of 
Intermediate Exchange Rate Regimes,” Mimeographed document, 1999. 
24 Eduardo Levy Yeyeati and Federico Sturzenegger. “The Euro and Latin America. Implications of the 
Euro for Latin America’s Financial and Banking Systems.” Working Paper, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, 
Buenos Aires: 1999. 
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Conclusion 
 
The internationalisation of the euro is in its initial stages and it is therefore difficult to 
draw any definitive conclusions regarding its scope and its implications for Latin 
America. Indeed, as indicated at the beginning of this study, the emergence of an 
internationally used currency is slow and subject to inertial forces. Nonetheless, several 
fairly robust conclusions can be inferred from the results of our analysis. 
 
First, with regard to the development of the IMS, if one takes into account the 
initial experience of the euro on the international scene and the teachings of economic 
theory, the most plausible medium- to long-term scenario seems to be the development of 
an asymmetrical duopoly. This means the euro will come to share the dollar’s role as a 
financial currency, while the U.S. currency will continue to prevail in trade transactions.
25 
Even though one can argue with this hypothesis, it seems credible that the dollar will 
maintain its dominant position for a considerable time, during which there will be a 
gradually increasing bipolarisation of the IMS.  In a context of scant international 
monetary cooperation, this scenario presupposes high volatility between the two main 
international currencies, which will be a powerful destabilising factor for third countries. 
 
Secondly, the first three years of the euro's existence confirm that its growing use 
in financial operations—which now far outweigh transactions in goods and services—
will represent a decisive vector (although insufficient in the long term) in its 
internationalisation. In turn, the effects of the expansion of the euro bond markets on the 
capital markets of the issuing zone are not neutral. Together with other factors, the 
growth of the bond market will tend to increase the pressure to widen and deepen the 
euro financial market and make it more liquid. This should favour the development of 
better terms for payback period, refinancing, coverage and arbitrage conditions for both 
European and third-country participants. 
 
Third, the study of the channels for generalising the use of the different key 
currencies as anchor currencies shows that the likelihood of anchoring a national 
currency to the dollar decreases when the share of a country's external debt denominated 
in euros increases. If the Latin American countries continue to increase their borrowing in 
euros and this translates into a greater diversification of their international reserves, some 
of them might consider the possibility of using the euro currency in anchor baskets, 
especially in those cases where the euro zone is a major trading partner. Nevertheless, the 
dollar will continue to have a preponderant role in those baskets, given the entrenchment 
of the U.S. currency in Latin America. On the other hand, the medium- to long-term 
consequences on exchange arrangements will have to be included in the international 
scenario that is beginning to take shape since the creation of the euro. The previously 
                                                           
25 An asymmetrical duopoly of rivalry between the dollar and the euro that has both economic and political 
implications (Cohen, 2000). Also, as certain recent studies suggest (Artus, 2001), the internationalization—
and thus its strengthening—assume the euro—and therefore of its strength—assumes a substantial increase 
in the euro zone’s potential for economic expansion. The latter essentially depends on the zone’s 
demography and capital stock, which implies widening it to include young and undercapitalized countries.   25  
mentioned factors tending to enhance the possibility of adopting anchor baskets (at least 
in the case of some Latin American countries) would be further supported by the 
medium- to long-term scenario we regard as more likely: an increasingly bipolar but 
asymmetrical IMS presupposes high volatility between the two main international 
currencies. In this context, de facto and de jure anchoring focused exclusively on the 
dollar, which in theory offers substantial gains in terms of credibility, could turn out to be 
fatal for countries that maintain close trade and financial relations with the euro zone.   26  
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Appendix I 
 
Method of calculation of de facto arrangements and their results 
 
The most frequently used method to identify a de facto arrangement consists in 
estimating an equation that explains the exchange-rate variations of each currency by 
means of the exchange-rate fluctuations of the major reference currencies (dollar, yen, 
mark, euro, etc.): 
ut eYkt a eEkt a e kt a a eikt + + + + = & & & & 3 2 $ 1 0  
 
where, eikt & = designates the exchange rate variation of currency i in relation to currency k 
between t and t—1. $, E and Y designate the dollar, the euro and the yen, respectively. 
 
The constant a0  is positive if i is depreciated (or devalued) regularly to compensate for a 
positive inflation differential (case of real anchors or crawling pegs). Coefficients aj  are 
interpreted as the weight of each reference currency in the implicit basket of country i. 
 
The cases that can arise are:  1 = aij , which represents unit anchoring in relation to one 
currency (a single significant coefficient, equal to the unit);  1 0 < < aij , which represents 
anchoring to a basket of currencies (at least two significant coefficients, where the sum is 
equal to the unit);  ∀ = j ij a   for   0 , which represents a free float (no coefficient is different 
from zero). 
 
As the direct estimate of the equation poses the problem of defining the numeraire k (a 
currency that fluctuates independently from the major explanatory currencies), Bénassy-
Quéré and Coeuré use: 
u X it i it i + = β α '  
where, () e e e X iYt iEt t i it & & & , , $ = , α i  represents the weighting vector and  βi  is a scalar. 
 
The equation is estimated as a condition of orthogonality using the generalised-moment 
method, with the restriction: 
∑ =
=
3
1
1
ji
ij α  
 
The estimate was made for 111 currencies, on the basis of weekly exchange rates and 
covering two periods: April 1995 to June 1997 (prior to the Asian crisis) and October 
1998 to December 1999 (after the crisis). The euro was identified with the ecu prior to 
January 1999. Of the 111 countries used by Bénassy-Quéré and Cœuré, the following 93 
were selected for this study.   31  
Argentina Cote d'Ivoire Honduras Mexico Slovakia
Bangladesh Croatia Hungary Mongolia South Korea
Barbados Czech Republic India Morocco Sri Lanka
Benin Djibouti Indonesia Mozambique Syria
Bolivia Dominica Iran Nepal Tanzania
Brazil Dominican Rep. Jamaica Nicaragua Thailand
Bulgaria Ecuador Jordan Niger The Gambia
Burkina Faso Egypt Kazakhstan Nigeria Togo
Burundi El Salvador Kenya Pakistan
Trinidad and 
Tobago
Cambodia
Equatorial 
Guinea
Laos Panama Tunisia
Cameroon Estonia Latvia Paraguay Turkey
Central 
African Rep.
Ethiopia Lebanon Peru Ukraine
Chad Gabon Lithuania Philippines Uruguay
Chile Ghana Madagascar Poland Venezuela
China Grenada Malaw i Romania Vietnam
Colombia Guatemala Malaysia
Russian 
Federation
Zambia
Comoros Guinea–Bissau Mali Senegal Zimbabw e
Congo Guyana Mauritania Seychelles
Costa Rica Haiti Mauritius Sierra Leone
Source:  
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Appendix II 
 
Principal component factor analysis (PCFA) 
 
Principal component factor analysis makes it possible to represent numerous relations 
between variables in a small number of factors.  The observations (or individuals) can be 
represented (projected) on a plane defined by the factor axes. 
 
This quantitative method adjusts better to the analysis of a group of heterogeneous 
variables, i.e., expressed in units that are a priori different. Standardising each variable 
eliminates the arbitrariness resulting from the use of different measuring scales, which is 
expressed in a non-comparable dispersion. Thus, each variable has a variance that is 
equal to 1. For J variables, the total variance (that measures the overall dispersion of the 
individuals resulting from all variables) is equal to J. 
 
Geometrically, the variables are represented by points situated on a sphere. The angle 
between two variables illustrates the correlation between them (Bravais-Pearson's linear 
correlation coefficient): this is the cosine of the angle. The correlation is more strongly 
positive when the angle is acute and more strongly negative when the angle is obtuse. 
The correlation is null when the two variables form a right angle. 
The PCFA provides an orderly group of axes and corresponding eigenvalues. Eigenvalue 
n° α is the variance of the factor corresponding to axis α. The sum of the eigenvalues is 
always equal to the total variance. If the original variables all have a variance that is 
equal to 1 (by construction), the first factors will have a variance that is notably greater 
than 1: each of them embodies the disparity of observations attributable to a group of 
variables. As of a certain range, the factors associate with eigenvalues that are lower than 
1. Thus, these last factors express less disparity between individuals than any of the 
original variables; this leads us to consider that the information they provide in terms of 
disparity between individuals is residual and, therefore, allows us to eliminate them from 
the result-interpretation process. 
The factor coordinates of individuals (projections on the factor axes) can be used as new 
(compound) variables in econometric equations. These variables, that summarise the 
information contained in the original group of variables, present orthogonality as a 
fundamental characteristic, i.e. they eliminate all risk of multicollinearity. 
 
 